5

Data and Methodology
This paper uses data from COMPUSTAT from which earnings per share (E), book value per share (BV), shares outstanding, stock prices, and dividends paid are obtained, and from which trailing price to earnings (P/E) and price to book value (P/BV) ratios and market cap are derived. For the trailing P/E and P/BV ratios, the price (P) is as of the end of April of year (t) and E and BV are, respectively, the December (t-1) fully diluted annual earnings per share and book value per share for companies with fiscal year end December (t-1), as reported in COMPUSTAT. Market cap is derived by multiplying price per share times shares outstanding at the end of April of year t. Annual total stock returns for the second sub-period are calculated as the price change plus the dividend from April of year t to April of year t+1 over the price in April of year t, using COMPUSTAT. For the first sub-period, due to data unavailability, annual total returns were calculated as above, but data for the calculation were obtained from the Canadian
Financial Markets Research Center (CFMRC) data base.
Our sample includes all December fiscal year end non-financial services companies that trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). 4 Based on this, we started with COMPUSTAT's industrial 4443 yearfirm observations (data) belonging to 1263 companies for the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] , and 4503 year-firm observations (data) belonging to 1081 companies for the period 1999-2007. We carried out a number of screenings to the data. Companies are not income trusts. Companies are required to have return data available for the year following the determination of P/E and P/BV ratios unless a company was acquired in which case the stock return for the remaining annual period was assumed to be the Canadian t-bill 6 month rate obtained from the Bank of Canada database. To prevent problems arising from including negative or extremely positive P/E and P/BV ratio firms, and eliminate likely data errors (See La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , Griffin and Lemmon (2002) and Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2003) ), we have excluded negative P/E and P/BV ratios, as well as P/E ratios in excess of 150 and P/BV in excess of 20. Firms had to have both P/E and P/BV ratios within the aforementioned boundaries to be 4 We exclude financial services companies, such as banks and insurance companies, since the high leverage normally employed by these companies does not have the same meaning as for non-financial companies for which high leverage indicates financial distress. included in the sample. Finally, to be included in our sample a stock had to have a price over $1. 5, 6 Our data, which are adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends, are for each year over two distinctly different sub-periods, 1985-1999 and 1999-2007 . These periods were chosen and kept separate for the following reasons: The first sub-period was characterized by a steadily rising stock market, while the second sub-period was a most challenging period for the stock market -with the exception of the materials and oil sectors, the stock market overall remained mostly flat over this subperiod which also included the burst of the stock market bubble. After all aforementioned screenings, we end up with 2139, in 1985-1999, and 1301, in 1999-2007, cross sectional-time series (firm-year) observations belonging to a cumulative number of 406 and 377 unique companies, respectively over the two sample sub-periods. The tables below report the total number of observations (companies examined) per year for each sub-period. Sub-period 1985 Sub-period -1999 Year  Number of Observations  1985  133  1986  142  1987  139  1988  168  1989  147  1990  135  1991  126  1992  98  1993  116  1994  164  1995  222  1996  174  1997  178  1998  197   5 Since our sample only includes firms with fiscal year end December of year (t-1), all firms have released their annual reports needed for the valuations and information for earnings per share and book value per share by April of year (t).
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For sub-period 1985-1999, the no income trust screen eliminated 182 observations, price over $1 39 observations, the P/E restrictions 722 observations and the P/BV restrictions 108 observations. In addition, 407 and further 846 observations were eliminated as there were no price and EPS data, respectively available in COMPUSTAT. For sub-period 1999 For sub-period -2007 , the no income trust screen eliminated 971 observations, price over $1 622 observations, the P/E restrictions 563 observations and the P/BV restrictions 15 observations. In addition, 811 and further 220 observations were eliminated as there were no price and EPS data, respectively available in COMPUSTAT. Sub-period 1999 Sub-period -2007 Year Number of  Observations  1999  162  2000  175  2001  177  2002  148  2003  144  2004  150  2005  167  2006  178   7 At the end of April of every year (t), starting either in 1985 or in 1999, firms are ranked based on trailing P/E ratios from low to high and the ranked firms are divided into four groups of equal size. Each P/E based quartile is then subdivided into four quartiles based on P/BV ratios from low to high. This process is repeated for each year of our sample. Membership in a quartile changes each year as multiples change from year to year. Inclusion in a quartile depends on a stock's multiple in relation to other stocks' multiples. Because P/E and P/BV ratios change over time, an arbitrary measure across time for all stocks in our sample would be inappropriate. The range of P/E -P/BV ratios per year for the low P/E -low P/BV basket (Q1) and the high P/E -high P/BV basket (Q16), per sub-period, are reported in the tables below. In the first sub-period, we end up with 140 observations in both the low and high P/E -low P/BV baskets (Q1 and Q16). In the second sub-period, we end up with 81 observations in the low P/E -low P/BV basket (Q1) and 85 observations in the high P/E -high P/BV basket (Q16). The reason for this discrepancy in the latter sub-period is the following. Unlike Q16, we actually carry out valuations on Q1 stocks and while a few stocks in the low P/E -low P/BV basket did not possess the ticker suffix used for filtering income trusts, namely .U, upon closer inspection during valuation of Q1 stocks, we found that some stocks were actually income trusts and, thus, were subsequently eliminated. For this reason, in some years, we have fewer stocks in Q1 than Q16.
For each stock within each portfolio, returns are obtained for the following year (starting in May 1, 1985 1, or 1999 1, and ending April 30, 1999 1, or 2007 , respectively in each sub-period) and equally weighted mean (and median) returns for each portfolio (basket) are derived (See Fama and French (1992) , Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ).
Basket-1 (Q1) is the lowest P/E -lowest P/BV ratio portfolio or the value stocks, while Basket-16 (Q16) is the highest P/E -highest P/BV ratio portfolio or the growth stocks. The P/E and P/BV sorting requirement was made in order to reduce the number of stocks we had to actually evaluate due to the labor intensity of the project. For each sub-period, the number of observations for each basket per year is reported in the tables below. The 140 overall observations for the first sub-period belong to 78 unique A time series of non-overlapping annual returns are obtained for each stock within the Q1 and Q16 portfolios (and for each portfolio) from May 1, 1985 May 1, (1999 to April 30, 1999 April 30, (2007 . Summary statistics of variables of interest (i.e., value and growth stock returns, value premium, market cap) for the various stocks and portfolios are calculated and univariate analysis ensues that looks at value and growth stock performance and the value premium. If a stock stopped trading due to an acquisition, then the remaining of the year returns for this stock were estimated as being the Canadian 6-month t-bill rate of return obtained from the Bank of Canada database. For Q1, there were 1 stock in 1986, 1993, 1996, 1997, and 2002 , and 2 stocks in 2000 that stopped trading within a given year. For Q16, there were 1 stock in 1986, 1987, 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2002 that stopped trading within a given year. Combined in Q1 and Q16, we had overall 7 companies in 1985-1999 and 6 companies in 1999-2007 for which we had to use the 6 month t-bill assumption. Appendices A, B (which show the stocks contained in Q1 and Q16) and D (which shows the stocks from Q1 selected as truly undervalued after careful valuation) highlight the stocks that stopped trading within a year and the t-bill assumption had to be made.
As soon as a value premium is established, we then go on to determine whether the second step of the value investing process, namely, valuing each stock and determining whether it is truly undervalued to buy, will beat the naïvely determined value stocks, namely, the first step of the value investing process.
To determine the truly undervalued stocks, the naively chosen stocks from Q1 were individually valued. The annual reports of the companies in question were obtained from Sedar.com. The objective here was to see if investing in the truly undervalued stocks, using a valuation approach employed by value investors, will lead to returns higher than those of the naively chosen Q1 stocks.
For each stock in Q1, two valuations were carried out. First, the net replacement value of each company's assets (called Net Asset Value) was estimated using an approach similar to the one described in Greenwald etc. (2001) . Second, a Free cash Flow (FCF) based valuation for each company was produced (called Earnings Power Value), by normalizing FCFs and discounting them to infinity using a perpetuity formula. The discount rate was the weighted average costs of capital (WACC), with the cost of equity obtained from the bond plus risk premium approach described in Athanassakos (1998) , and the cost of debt obtained from the company's rating and the YTM of similarly rated companies obtained from Canadian Bond Rating Service and Scotia Capital Markets (1985-1999) and Moodys and Bloomberg (1999-2007) . The weights in the WACC formula were the company's target capital structure weights.
Value investors believe that in the long run, in a free entry market, the return on invested capital (ROIC) will be equal to WACC, and so for the majority of companies the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model becomes one of perpetuity. However, if a company has a sustainable competitive advantage, a (real) growth assumption is incorporated in the DCF model and the value with growth (Vg) is derived.
Consequently, for each company two values were derived. One is the Net Asset Value (NAV) and the other the Earnings Power Value (EPV). Where exactly the company's intrinsic value lies depends on strategic analysis and the probabilities of possible outcomes. If the NAV exceeds the EPV, a catalyst was assumed depending on the probability of a takeover or the probability of management change given public information available in the financial press. In this case, the company's intrinsic value was between NAV and EPV. Whether the intrinsic value was closer to NAV than EPV depended on how high or low the probability of the aforementioned changes was, respectively. If EPV was above NAV, then an analysis of the company's competitive environment was made to determine whether the company had a sustainable competitive advantage. If that was the case, then the company's intrinsic value was its EPV; if not, the company's intrinsic value was between EPV and NAV. How close to EPV or NAV the intrinsic value was depended on how strong we felt, given available information and our strategic analysis of the industry and company, the probability of sustainability of competitive advantage was.
The lower this probability, the closer to NAV the intrinsic value was and vice versa. If a (real) growth assumption was necessary, then the value with growth was estimated (Vg) which for obvious reasons exceeded EPV (the no growth valuation to perpetuity). In this case, the company's intrinsic value was Vg.
We found 87 cases in the first sub-period and 54 cases in the second sub-period, in which NAV was above EPV, 2 and 18 cases, respectively for which EPV was above NAV and no case and only 1 case, respectively for which a growth assumption was necessary, that is, when Vg was higher than EPV. 7 Once, the intrinsic value is estimated, the entry price is calculated as 2/3 of the intrinsic value. This allows for 1/3 margin of safety. The entry price in the growth case is the lower of EPV or 2/3 of Vg.
If a stock's current price is below the entry price, a decision is made to invest in this stock; the stock is truly undervalued. Otherwise, a decision is made not to invest in the stock in the following 12 month period. At the end of each 12-month period, stocks are liquidated and annual returns are calculated for this period. At the beginning of the next 12-month period, new intrinsic values and entry prices are re-estimated. Stocks whose current price is below their re-estimated entry price are invested in the new sophisticated portfolio for the following 12 months, and the process continues for every subsequent 12-month period. That is, at the beginning of each 12-month period, every stock in the sophisticated portfolio needs to have met the condition of having a price less than its entry price to justify its position in the following year's sophisticated portfolio. While this portfolio rebalancing may not be entirely true for all value investors many of whom may still be invested in the stock as long as it hasn't reached its intrinsic value, the fact that a stock has moved up over the previous year and is now 7
In the first sub-period, the valuation team found a number of companies that were outside their "circle of competence" to value reliably. These companies were (26) resource companies (eliminated due to uncertain real options), (6) private equity firms or holding companies (eliminated due to uncertain value of investments or holdings) and (12) companies of high business and financial risk (due to extreme financial distress situations). In addition, five companies had no data available and 2 companies were recent IPOs for which no historical data were available and they were thus eliminated from the valuation step. The exclusion of such companies also helped reduce the number of companies that had to be valued and made the project more manageable. As a result, 89 companies were actually valued and not 140 as originally indicated for sub-period 1985-1999. In the second sub-period, where there were fewer companies to be valued, at the valuation step, the valuation team eliminated six companies that had high business and financial risk and two companies for which annual reports were not available. No other companies were eliminated in this sub-period as the valuation team felt that the remaining companies were within their "circle of competence" and could be reasonably valued. As a result, 73 companies were actually valued and not 81 as originally indicated for sub-period 1999-2007. above its new entry price may mean that much of the upside on the stock has been realized and better investment opportunities may exist in other stocks with price less than entry price that are worth investing in with higher upside. Besides, our objective is to compare the returns of the sophisticated portfolio to those of the naïve Q1 portfolio and, to do this accurately and consistently, we need to derive annual total returns for both portfolios. Since the assumption of once a year rebalancing applies to Q1, the same assumption is also made for the sophisticated portfolio. The final number of stocks per year in the invested "sophisticated" portfolio (Q1S) is shown below. The total number of stocks purchased in the sophisticated portfolio corresponds to 44 companies (30 unique companies) in the first sub-period and 33 companies (24 unique companies) in the second sub-period. That is, a few companies were repeat members of the sophisticated portfolio as, year after year, they met the price less than entry price condition. Sub-period 1985 Sub-period -1999 Year # of Stocks in Sophisticated  Portfolio  1985  3  1986  3  1987  2  1988  2  1989  3  1990  3  1991  1  1992  1  1993  3  1994  3  1995  4  1996  5 To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine both steps of the value investing decision making approach and explore whether value investors add value to the strictly mechanical search process.
Empirical Results
3.1.
Step 1: The search Process -Is There a Value Premium? Tables 1 and 2 report, respectively, the mean and median annual returns of P/E -P/BV sorted value (Q1) and growth (Q16) portfolios and the value premium (Q1 minus Q16) per year and overall.
Table 1 also reports the variance of returns of the value and growth portfolios and their Sharpe ratio performance metrics for the two sub-periods examined. Figures 1 and 2 , on the other hand, shows diagrammatically how the value premium has behaved over the two sub-periods.
It is quite apparent from these Tables that a value premium exists and it is quite impressive for its size and consistency, particularly for the 1999-2007 sub-period. The value premium in Table 1 is mostly positive. In the years when the value premium is negative, the size of the value premium is relatively small, when compared with the years when the value premium is positive. In Table 2 Athanassakos (2009 (b) ), using again P/E sorting, finds that the mean value premium in the US is 6.24%, 11.40% and 6.00% for AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE stocks, respectively for the period 1986-2006. Tables 1 and 2 Tables 1 and 2 show that irrespective of the state of the world, the value strategy normally beats the growth strategy. shows that in the bear market years value and growth portfolios experience about the same return, whereas in 2001, the year of recession, value clearly beats growth. In Table 2 , Panel A, which shows medians for the period 1985-1999, the value premium is positive in 1991, the recessionary year. In How does the variance and firm-size of the value stocks compare to those of the growth stocks? Table 1 reports the variance of the annual returns of the value and growth portfolios, while Table 3 reports market cap of the value and growth portfolios per year over our two sub-periods. These tables show that value stocks tend to be smaller than growth stocks and that while the value portfolio has higher annual variance of returns than the growth portfolio in the second sub-period, the opposite is the case in the first sub-period. The smaller size of Q1 vs. Q16 may imply that the outperformance of value over growth stocks is driven by risk, as normally one would expect smaller stocks to have higher risk than larger stocks. However, if risk drove the findings, one would expect to find (a) consistently higher variance in the returns of value vs. growth stocks and (b) that the higher risk of value stocks is manifested more vividly during adverse states of the world (such as recessions and bear markets) at which time growth would beat value strategies. As this is not the case, one cannot attribute the return differences between value and growth stocks to possible higher risk of value stocks. The risk issue will also be addressed in the following section, where risk is incorporated in the valuation exercise, intrinsic value, entry price and final investment decision making.
Nevertheless, regardless of which way one wants to interpret this evidence, Table 1 shows that the Sharpe ratio of value stocks (0.24 in 1985-1999; and 0.83 in 1999-2007) exceeds the Sharpe ratio of growth stocks (0.14 in 1985-1999; and 0.75 in 1999-2007) indicating that value stocks have had a better risk adjusted performance than growth stocks over our sample sub-periods. The p-value of the difference between the Sharpe ratios of these two portfolios, calculated based on a test of significance discussed in Jobson and Korkie (1981) , is 0.09 in 1985-1999 and 0.03 in 1999-2007. Could it be that the value premium is driven only by a few value stocks with very large positive returns? Table 4 reports the percentage of stocks with positive and the percentage of stocks with negative returns for the value and growth portfolios for every year over our sample sub-periods. In the first sub-period, both value and growth stocks experience more positive than negative returns in 9 out of the 14 years. In the second sub-period, in every year, more stocks in the value portfolio have positive returns than negative. This is true only in 4 out of the 8 years for the growth portfolio. Consequently, the value premium is pervasive and not the result of a few outliers.
3.2.
Step 2: Valuation -Is Any Value Added?
Now that we established that there is a value premium over our sample sub-periods which is consistent with previous academic research, the question is: can a value investor with his/her ability to value stocks, using value investing principles, do better than an approach that naively picks a basket of stocks with the lowest P/E -P/BV ratio combination?
All stocks that were previously sorted in the value basket (Q1) are now individually valued in a very time consuming and laborious way. First, the intrinsic value of a stock is estimated as discussed earlier and then the entry price is calculated as intrinsic value less 1/3 of the intrinsic value -the margin of safety. If a stock's current price is below its entry price, a decision is made to buy this particular stock.
If not, a decision is made not to purchase the stock. We refer to the portfolio with the stocks in which we choose to invest as the "sophisticated portfolio" (Q1S), whereas the value portfolio Q1 is referred to as the "naïve portfolio". The annual and overall mean and median returns of the sophisticated portfolio and its excess returns from the naïve value Q1 portfolio are reported in Tables 5 and 6 . Figures 3 and 4, on the other hand, show diagrammatically the excess return of the sophisticated portfolio over the naïve portfolio over the two sample sub-periods. Appendix C shows the kind of reports we produced for each stock in portfolio Q1. Appendix D reports the actual stocks we chose to purchase and include in the sophisticated portfolio (Q1S) per sub-period after painstaking valuations.
The sophisticated portfolio (Q1S) beats the naïve Q1 portfolio both in mean and median returns.
The mean (median) outperformance in sub-period 1985-1999 is 1.10% (3.30%), while in sub-period 1999-2007 is 13.20% (3.80%). Tables 5 and 6 also show that the sophisticated portfolio beats the naïve one in both bear market years and the recessionary market years. Irrespective of the state of the world, both the mean and median returns of the sophisticated portfolio exceed those for the naive portfolio.
Moreover, it can be easily inferred from Tables 5 and 6 that the sophisticated portfolio outperforms the naïve portfolio by more in adverse states of the world than in favorable states of the world. Finally, Table 7 reports that, in general, the percentage of positive returns in the sophisticated portfolio is higher than the percentage of positive returns in the naïve portfolio.
Table 5 also shows that the variance of the sophisticated portfolio is somewhat higher than the variance of the naïve one, while Table 8 shows that the market cap of these two portfolios is about the same. The risk adjusted returns of the sophisticated portfolio exceed those of the "naive portfolio" as exemplified by the higher Sharpe ratio of the sophisticated portfolio than the naïve one (See Tables 5   and 6 ). The Sharpe ratio for the sophisticated and naïve portfolios is 0.30 vs. 0.24 in 1985-1999, and 1.07 vs. 0.83, in 1999-2007, respectively. 8 The p-value of the difference between the Sharpe ratios of these two portfolios, again calculated based on a test of significance discussed in Jobson and Korkie (1981) , is 0.15 in 1985-1999 and 0.01 in 1999-2007. 9 Moreover, the valuation exercise described above and the eventual decision to buy a stock in the sophisticated portfolio accounts for risk and makes the final stock selection less risky in the sense of reducing the possibility of loss of capital. 10 Preserving capital is of paramount importance in the investment decision process of value investors. The margin of safely taken off the intrinsic value to arrive at the entry price ensures downside protection that goes beyond diversification without sacrificing the returns of the chosen stocks. In addition, Q1 and Q1S are both from the same basket of stocks and have the same market cap as shown in Table 8 . And the fact that the sophisticated portfolio beats the naïve one by more in adverse than favorable states of the world further supports the argument that the risk of the sophisticated portfolio is not higher than that of the naïve portfolio.
Hence, risk does not seem to drive the outperformance of the stocks that value investors choose to eventually invest in (i.e., the truly undervalued stocks), which is the key contribution of this paper.
Finally, not only does the sophisticated portfolio beats the naïve portfolio Q1, but Q1 significantly beats Q16, making the sophisticated portfolio outperform Q16 by a substantial amount,
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It is possible that the exclusion of the companies indicated in footnote #7 from the second step of the value investing process may have impacted the strength of the findings in the first sub-period as there may have been many truly undervalued stocks among the excluded companies.
9
It should be noted that this test has low power in the sense that is it is difficult to find statistical significance even if the true difference in Sharpe ratios is not zero.
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The issue of whether risk or behavioral factors drive the value premium has arisen because academics deal only with the first step of the value investing process. Not knowing what stocks value investors tend to buy, academics resort to arguments about risk to justify the value premium (See Fama and French (1992 , 1993 , 1996 ). However, if one knows the intrinsic value of a stock and its entry price (which accounts for the margin of safety), and, hence, what stocks value investors would buy, as per second step of the value investing process, then he/she should know the risk of the portfolio/stocks. In the valuation process, risk is adjusted through the risk premium in the discount factor and in the final selection process risk is controlled for via the margin of safety.
which is too large to be explained by possible risk differences. As a result, value investors proceeding to the second step in the stock selection process do add value. Tables 9 and 10 show the mean and median annual returns for Q1 and Q16, while Tables 11 and   12 show the mean and median annual returns for Q1S (the "sophisticated" (value) portfolio) and Q1 (the 
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Our sophisticated portfolio is quite concentrated. However, the margin of safety acts as a way to protect capital which is distinct from, and in many respects consistent with, diversification. Moreover, the superior performance of the sophisticated portfolio is consistent with Kacperczyk et al. (2007) who find that all concentrated funds in their study did well, but the more concentrated did the best. We see that over the two years of the "great recession", the mean and median returns for the growth portfolio exceed those for the value portfolio by a significant amount for both the normal and 
Conclusions
Value investors wish to buy stocks at a discount to intrinsic value. To find the heavily discounted stocks, value investors follow a two step process. First they search for possibly undervalued stocks, using screening metrics, such as P/E and/or P/BV ratios. Second, they carefully apply a valuation technology to all possibly undervalued stocks that passed the first step and arrive at their investment decision by applying the concept of "margin of safety" in order to determine which among those stocks are truly undervalued.
The purpose of this paper was first to examine whether a value premium existed following a mechanical screening process (i.e., the search process) in the Canadian markets between 1985-1999 and 1999-2007 , and second whether value investors added value in the stock selection process by being able to find truly undervalued stocks from the universe of the possibly undervalued stocks identified from the search process.
First, we apply a cross-sorting process whereby value stocks are defined as the low P/E -low P/BV stocks and growth stocks as the high P/E -high P/BV stocks. Second, we examine whether the previously identified value stocks beat the growth stocks. Third, we focus on the low P/E -low P/BV stocks, which we carefully value and apply the concept of "margin of safety" to identify the truly undervalued stocks among them. Finally, we compare the returns of the truly undervalued stocks to those of the naively chosen value stocks of the search process.
We find that a strong and pervasive value premium exists in Canada over our sample period that persists in bull and bear markets and during recessions/recoveries. Value stocks, on average, beat growth stocks even when using a very mechanical screening of the search process. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that value investors do add value, in the sense that their process of selecting truly undervalued stocks, via in-depth security valuation of the possibly undervalued stocks and arriving at their investment decision using the concept of "margin of safety", produces positive excess returns over and above the naive approach of simply selecting low P/E -P/BV ratio stocks.
The paper was extended to the years of the "great recession" and despite the fact that over this extended period we had a severe recession and bear market, on average, the sophisticated portfolio still beat the naïve value portfolio, consistent with earlier evidence.
In conclusion, value investors proceeding to the second step of the stock selection process do add value. 
*
The p-value of the difference between the Sharpe ratios of the two portfolios is 0.09.
**
The p-value of the difference between the Sharpe ratios of the two portfolios is 0.03. 
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The p-value of the difference between the Sharpe ratios of the two portfolios is 0.15.
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